把公民身份证券化！Securitize Citizenship!
人们讨厌移民和移民者，因为在他们的想象里，这就像在一场零和博弈中与新来者争夺有限的资源。这种论调在经济层面有许多站不住脚的地方，但我们先暂且放下这一点。让我们给每个人都发一份股份。
假设我们给每个美国公民额外发一本护照——一本空白护照。在符合常识的某些限制下（比如不卖给恐怖分子），每个人都可以把自己这本多余的护照卖给想移民的人。你可以把它送给某个值得的人、爱国的人、才华横溢的人，或者任何愿意付给你一大笔现金的人。你或许还可以用它换一本外国的护照。很可能，市场会出现，对这些护照进行估值和交易，人们会花钱购买，或者承诺未来的收入流（最好的情况是个人 IPO，最坏的情况是契约奴役），以求进入理想的国家。
但现在想一想：如果一个国家出台了糟糕的贸易或税收政策，会发生什么。所有护照价值的总和，就等于这个国家政府价值的资本化。糟糕的政策若降低了这一价值，就会导致护照的需求随之下降，价格也跟着下跌。你的护照和那本多余的护照，很可能是你最值钱的资产，价值数百万美元。糟糕的政府政策会引发公民股东们大规模的负面反馈。
事实上，某些无法货币化的政策如今也会显露出它们的成本，我们就能看清支持堕胎选择权（pro-choice）与反堕胎（pro-life）、某些环境政策等等的价值。如果你的政府行事不合你意，你随时可以卖掉护照一走了之，但很可能，糟糕的政府会先被公民股东们赶下台。
最后，在异想天开的极限情形下，那些展现出精明经济管理能力的国家，可以对管理不善的国家的公开交易护照发动敌意但和平的收购。如果每本护照相当于民主体制下的一票，中国就可以买下印度，让印度采用对中国行之有效的同一套经济方案，之后甚至还可以转手卖掉，赚上一笔！
People hate immigration and immigrants as it’s seen as competing with newcomers over finite resources in a zero-sum game. This argument is flawed on many economic levels, but let’s overlook that for a moment. Let’s give everyone a stake.
Suppose that we gave every US citizen an extra passport – a blank one. Within certain common-sense restrictions (i.e., no terrorists) each person could sell their extra passport to a would-be immigrant. You could give it to someone deserving, or patriotic, or brilliant, or whoever would just pay you a lot of cash. You could perhaps exchange it for a foreign one. Likely, markets would emerge to value and trade these things, and people would pay or promise future earnings streams (personal IPOs in the best case, indentured servitude in the worst) to get into desirable countries.
But now think what would happen if a country enacted bad trade or tax policy. The sum of all of the value of the passports would equal the capitalized value of the government of the country. Poor policy that reduced this value would result in the demand, and therefore the price, of passports falling. Your passport and your extra one would probably be your most valuable possessions, worth millions of dollars. Poor government policy would lead to massive negative feedback from the citizen-shareholders.
In fact, certain un-monetizable policies would now reveal their costs, and we could see the value of pro-choice v. pro-life, certain environmental policies, etc. If your government isn’t doing things the way that you want, you can always sell your passport and get out, but likely the poor government would be ousted by citizen-shareholders first.
Finally, in the fanciful stretch case, countries that have shown themselves to be astute economic managers could engage in hostile yet peaceful takeovers of the publicly-traded passports of poorly managed countries. If each passport entitled you to one vote in a democracy, China could buy India, put it on the same economic program that has worked well for the Chinese, and perhaps even sell it off for a profit later!